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Justice Anthony Kennedy's Free Speech Legacy
NADINE STROSSEN

Justice Kennedy has been hailed by free speech advocates as a leadingfree speech champion.
In contrast, other experts have not only criticized particular opinions and votes by Justice
Kennedy that rejectedfree speech claims, but they also have maintainedthat Justice Kennedy
specifically declined to protect speech that was at odds with his conservative political and
religious views. It is certainly true that Justice Kennedy did not uphold freedom of speech in
some important contexts, including when the Government asserted countervailing national
security or "War on Drugs" concerns. However, in other important cases, Justice Kennedy
showed couragein defendingfreedom for expression that was not only inconsistentwith his own
views and values, but also reviled by the public, thus earninghim enormous criticism.Moreover,
in enforcing the First Amendment's non-Establishment Clause, Justice Kennedy displayed
similar courage in re-examining and revising his own views in a major case, thus protecting
individual religious libertyfrom government andpopularpressure in the sensitive public school
context. Overall,we can draw inspirationfrom JusticeKennedy's consistentvision that we must
be free to make our own choices in the realm of ideas and beliefs, even if we may disagreewith
particularchoices Justice Kennedy made in implementing that vision.

Professor Strossen gratefully acknowledges the contributions of her Research Assistants, N.Y.L.S.
students Jennifer Henriquez and Marc Walkow. Marc greatly assisted in the editing and proofreading of this
Essay; he also prepared the footnotes, so all credit and responsibility for them are due to him and to the Hastings
Law Journaleditors.
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I am happy to participate in this important symposium, and I want to thank
and congratulate everyone who has done such great work to organize it,
including my major contact, the Hastings Law Journal Executive Symposium
Editor, Nina Gliozzo.
I also welcome the chance to reconnect with longstanding colleagues and
friends, including Hastings Law Professor Matt Coles, the Hastings Law
Journal'sFaculty Advisor who kindly invited me to participate in this program.
Matt is justly celebrated for his pioneering leadership on issues concerning
sexual orientation and gender identity, but he also has been an essential leader
on the whole broad civil liberties agenda: defending all fundamental freedoms
for all people. Matt deeply understands, and has powerfully explained, a point
that is not as widely appreciated as it should be: that all rights, for all people, are
indivisible.
This ties directly to the specific aspect of Justice Kennedy's free speech
rulings that Nina asked me to discuss: his support of freedom even for "hate
speech," 1 or speech that disparages people who traditionally have been subject
to discrimination. Nina invited me to focus on this issue because it is the topic
of my recent book: HATE: Why We Should Resist It with Free Speech, Not
Censorship.2 So let me give you a thumbnail sketch of my book's conclusions
and of Justice Kennedy's pertinent opinions.
A major reason I oppose censoring "hate speech" flows from the actual
track record of such censorship, and the actual track record of non-censorial
measures for combating hatred and discrimination. The evidence shows that
censorship is at best ineffective in countering discrimination, and at worst
counterproductive, too often targeting speech by the very minority groups it is
intended to protect.3 Conversely, while we of course have much ongoing work
to advance equality and diversity, the progress we have made has depended on
a robust freedom of speech; sufficiently robust that it extends to ideas that
officials and powerful interest groups consider hateful and dangerous.
Justice Kennedy stressed this very point in his last pertinent Supreme Court
opinion, in the Court's most recent "hate speech" case, Matal v. Tam, in 2017.
The Court unanimously struck down a provision in the federal trademark law
that denied trademark protection to terms that the enforcing officials deemed to

1. Along with other commentators, I put this term in quotation marks to underscore the fact that it is not
a constitutional law term of art;
the Supreme Court never has identified a category of speech that receives no
First Amendment protection, or less protection, based on its hateful content. To the contrary, as the text explains,
the Court consistently and by consensus has refused to recognize any such categorical exception to general First
Amendment precepts.
2. NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP (2018).
3. See id. at 86 88; Randall Kennedy, Is the Cure of CensorshipBetter thanthe Disease of Hate Speech?,
KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/news/cure-censorship-betterdisease-hate-speech.
4. 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017).
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be disparaging to certain people, including ethnic minorities.' The Court's
opinion, by Justice Alito, stressed time-honored First Amendment principles that
shield freedom even for "the thought that we hate," quoting
this famous phrase
6
that had been coined by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate partial concurrence that, notably, was
joined by three of the Court's most liberal Justices (Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Sotomayor).' While "hate speech" laws aim to protect members of minority
groups, Justice Kennedy stressed that those groups actually have the most to lose
from such censorship and the most to gain from free speech protection for "hate
speech." As he explained:
A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some portion of
the public can be turned against minority and dissenting views to the detriment

of all. The First Amendment does not entrust that power to the government's
benevolence. Instead, our reliance must be on
the substantial safeguards of free
8
and open discussion in a democratic society.

Indeed, the facts in the Matal case itself illustrate Justice Kennedy's
insight. The speakers that the government sought to censor were not hatemongers slinging slurs against members of a minority group. To the contrary,
the censored speakers were themselves members of a minority group, who were
using a traditional slur in order to assert their ethnic pride, by reclaiming that
term.9 Specifically, Asian American rock musician Simon Tam and his fellow
Asian American band members proclaimed their pro-human rights activism
through their chosen band name: "The Slants." When the Supreme Court barred
the government from blocking that choice, it simultaneously upheld not only the
band members' free speech rights, but also their equality and dignity.
Likewise, advocates of LGBT rights have explained that these rights in
particular have been especially dependent on robust free speech principles, given
the reinforcing nature of declaring one's identity and demanding one's
equality.10 Therefore, it is fitting that Justice Kennedy has been celebrated both

5. Id. at 1747 (striking down 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012)).
6. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
7. Id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 1769.
9. Id. at 1766 ("[R]espondent endeavors to use The Slants to supplant a racial epithet, using new insights,
musical talents, and wry humor to make it a badge of pride.").
10. See William B. Rubenstein, Since When IstheFourteenth Amendment Our Route to Equality? Some
Reflections on the Constructionof the 'Hate-Speech 'Debate from a LesbianlGayPerspective, in SPEAKING OF
RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CivIL LIBERTIES 280 (1994).
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as the Court's foremost free
speech champion, and as the Court's leading
12
champion of LGBT rights.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Matal made another point in
support of the conclusion that "hate speech" laws, no matter how well intended,
might well do more harm than good in countering discrimination: that the
process of listening to speech considered hateful, and analyzing and discussing
that speech, could plausibly increase the audience's support for equality, dignity,
diversity, and inclusivity. As he wrote:
The danger of viewpoint discrimination is that the government is attempting to
remove certain ideas or perspectives from a broader debate. That danger is all the
greater if the ideas or perspectives are ones a particular audience might think
offensive, at least at first hearing. An initial reaction may prompt further
reflection, leading to a more reasoned, more tolerant position. 13

Even beyond the two key issues of hate speech and LGBT rights, the
overarching theme of government neutrality also links other specific areas of
Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence: the notion that government must remain
neutral toward all ideas and toward all people. This theme pervaded one of his
last major majority opinions for the Court in the Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission14 case last June. Consistent with Justice
Kennedy's prior opinions upholding rights of LGBT individuals, he insisted that
businesses open to the general public must neutrally serve all people, regardless
of their sexual orientation, as mandated by public accommodation laws,
including the Colorado law at issue in that case. 15 Likewise, consistent with
Justice Kennedy's prior opinions on First Amendment issues concerning both
speech and religion, he insisted that government must neutrally evaluate claims
for exemption from public accommodation laws based on religious or
conscientious beliefs. 6 In the Masterpiece Cakeshop case, he concluded that the

11. See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, The First Amendment's Undisputed Champion, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2018,
6:37 PM), https://www.wsj.con/articles/the-first-amendments-undisputed-champion-1530311830;
Michael
Barone, Justice Kennedy's First Priority: The First Amendment, INVS.' Bus. DAILY (June 29, 2018),
https://www.investors.con/politics/columnists/j ustice-kennedy-retires-legacy-first-amendment-supreme-court;
James Burling, Justice Kennedy Left His Mark on American Liberty, PAC. LEGAL FOUND.: BLOG (June 27, 2018),
https://pacificlegal.org/justice-kennedy-and-pacific-legal-foundation-at-the-supreme-court.
But see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Anthony Kennedy and Free Speech, SCOTUSBLOG (July 2, 2018, 2:38 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/anthony-kennedy-and-free-speech ("Justice Anthony Kennedy will be

remembered as a staunch advocate of freedom of speech, but his actual record is more complicated than that.").
12. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Kennedy Emerges as Judicial Champion of Gay Rights, WASH. POST (June
26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts-law/kennedy-emerges-as-judicial-champion-ofgay-rights/2015/06/26/b295eb60-1c22-1le5-ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html;
Kent Greenfield & Adam
Winkler, Opinion, Without Kennedy, the Future of Gay Rights Is Fragile, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/opinion/kennedy-gay-rights-same-sex-marriage.html.
13. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
15. Id. at 1727 28.
16. Id. at 1728.
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exemption claim at issue had not received a "neutral ...consideration," 1
because some government officials had shown "a clear ...hostility toward" the
pertinent religious beliefs. 18
In my remaining time, I will comment further about the two facets of
Justice Kennedy's First Amendment views on which Nina encouraged me to
focus: his extremely strong support for the concept of neutrality in the free
speech context; and his evolving views about how to honor the concept of
neutrality in the Establishment Clause context, as manifested in his seemingly
dramatic shift between the County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter 9 case in 1989 and Lee v. Weisman21 in 1992.
So, let's start with free speech. As I already noted, in Matalv. Tam, Justice
Kennedy stressed that minority groups in particular have the most to gain from
strict enforcement of the content or viewpoint neutrality principle: that
government may not suppress constitutionally protected speech solely because
its message is considered hateful or otherwise evil; but rather, government may
generally suppress such speech only when, in its overall context, it directly
causes certain serious, specific, imminent harm, such as when it constitutes a
genuine threat, 21 or intentional incitement of imminent violence, 22 or targeted
23
harassment.
To be sure, all Justices in recent history have supported the general content
neutrality principle, which the Court has hailed as the "bedrock" 24 free speech
precept. That said, the Justices are often closely split on specific implementing
details-about how strictly that principle should actually be enforced in
particular cases.
In my limited time, I will discuss just one notable aspect of Justice
Kennedy's views about such details, which I think is particularly striking. In a
couple of cases relatively early in his Supreme Court tenure, he opined that
content-based speech regulations should be absolutely unconstitutional.25 Under
the Court's established doctrine, in contrast, content-based regulations are only
presumptively unconstitutional. They are subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and

17. Id. at 1729.
18. Id.
19. 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in partand dissenting in part)
(concluding that display of creche in county courthouse and display of menorah outside city building did not
violate Establishment Clause), abrogatedby Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
20. 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that clergy's offering of prayers as partof official public school
graduation ceremony was prohibited by the Establishment Clause).
21. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
22. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
23. Davis ex rel.
Lashonda D. v. Monroe Cry. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
24. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
25. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[C]ontent-based speech restrictions that do not fall with any traditional exception should be invalidated without
inquiry into narrow tailoring or compelling government interests."); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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they will be upheld if the government can show that they are narrowly tailored
to promote a goal of compelling importance. That burden is appropriately heavy,
so government can rarely satisfy it. However, the burden is not insurmountable,
and in some cases government has satisfied it.26 In Justice Kennedy's view, strict
scrutiny thus did not provide a sufficiently strong barrier to content-based
censorship: "[R]esort to the test might be read as a concession that States may
censor speech whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for doing
so." '2 7 He maintained that the strict scrutiny standard
derives from our equal protection jurisprudence, and has no real or legitimate
place when the Court considers the straightforward question whether the State
may enact a burdensome restriction of speech based on content only, apart28 from
any considerations of time, place, and manner or the use of public forums.

Ironically, Justice Kennedy himself joined the Court's majority in
29
upholding content-based censorship in Holder v. HumanitarianLaw Project
under a strict scrutiny standard, to the consternation of the dissenters, who
maintained that the majority was unduly deferential to the government.30
Justice Kennedy wrote some important opinions conveying his strong
opposition to regulations he deemed content-based, including his majority
opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission31 (about campaign
finance regulations) and his dissenting opinion in Hill v. Colorado 2 (about antiabortion protests). In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy's opinion stressed that
an essential aspect of content neutrality is speaker neutrality: that government
may neither disfavor nor favor particular speakers or groups of speakers,
including those that are organized in the form of unions or corporations. He
explained:
Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a
means to control content.
... The Government may not by these means deprive the public of the
right.., to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas
that flow from each.3 3

I advisedly referred above to regulations that Justice Kennedy "deemed"
content-based. On occasion, he concluded that the challenged regulations were
not content-based, thus taking a less speech-protective stance than other Justices,
who did deem these regulations to be content-based. In the Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC case, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion upheld the so-

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124 25 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
561 U.S. 1 (2010).
Id. at 54-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
530 U.S. 703, 765 92 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340-41.
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called "must carry rule" for cable TV channels, requiring them to carry local
broadcast channels. 4 Four Justices joined a partial dissent, which turned
completely on their treatment of the rule as content-based, thus triggering strict
scrutiny, 5 whereas Justice Kennedy3 6treated the rule as content-neutral, thus
subject only to intermediate scrutiny.
On the anti-free speech side of the ledger, in cases of particular concern to
me, Justice Kennedy also sometimes rejected free speech positions in ACLU
cases. One prominent example was Morse v. Frederick,3 a case in which we
defended high school student Joseph Frederick's right to display a banner
proclaiming "Bong Hits for Jesus." That said, from the standpoint of free speech
advocates, no Justice has had a perfect record-not even Hugo Black, who is
often touted as a free speech absolutist."8 Among his other anti-free speech
rulings, Justice Black wrote a strong dissent in another ACLU case in which we
successfully defended student speech rights: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
39
Community School District.
In sum, notwithstanding the significant cases in which Justice Kennedy
took a less speech-protective position than other Justices,4" considering his
overall record, he was fairly regarded as "the First Amendment's Undisputed
Champion," to quote the prominent First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams.41
In the wake of Justice Kennedy's resignation from the Court, Abrams wrote:
"He was the Supreme Court's most dedicated, consistent and eloquent defender
of the First Amendment. He played that role [both] when other conservatives
rejected First Amendment arguments, and when liberals did."42
Now let me turn to the two Establishment Clause opinions by Justice
Kennedy that I agreed to discuss: his 1989 partial dissent in County ofAllegheny
v. ACLU, GreaterPittsburgh Chapter and his 1992 majority opinion in Lee v.

34. 512 U.S. 622, 661 62(1994).
35. See id. at 676 (O'Comor, J, concurring in partand dissenting in part).
36. Id. at 661-62 (majority opinion).
37. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
38. See, e.g., Note, Reflections on Justice Black and Freedom of Speech, 6 VAL.U. L. REv. 316, 317
(1972); Sonja R. West,The Problem with Free Press Absolutism, 50 NEw ENG.L. REv. 191, 197 (2016).
39. 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black,J.,
dissenting).
40. E.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (joining majority opinion holding that
"material support and resources" provision of the pertinent federal statute was not unconstitutionally vague when
used to designate a group as a foreign terrorist organization); Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (joining majority opinion
holding that public schools may prohibit students from displaying messages that promote drug use); Beard v.
Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (joiing plurality opiion holding that a prison policy denying "incorrigible"
prisoners access to newspapers and magazines was not unconstitutional); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410
(2006) (authoring majority opinion holding that speech by public officials is not protected if engaged in as part
of their official public duties); Turner, 512 U.S. 622 (authoring majority opinion holding that a law requiring
that cable television operators "must carry" local broadcast channels was not an unconstitutional form of
government-compelled speech).
41. Abrams, supra note 11.
42. Id.
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Weisman.43 Both of these cases are of great general interest, but my personal
interest is heightened by the key role the ACLU played in both cases, as both
counsel and plaintiff, challenging government-sponsored religious displays or
exercises as violating the Establishment Clause. We won a partial victory in
Allegheny and a complete victory in Lee.
Before I say more about these cases and Justice Kennedy's key opinions in
them, I want to quote a distinguished lawyer, professor, and media commentator,
Harry Litman, who was clerking for Justice Kennedy during the term when the
Court ruled on the Allegheny case, and who is here today. The outstanding
lawyer and ACLU leader who argued the Allegheny case in the High Court was
my longtime friend and colleague Roz Litman-none other than Harry Litman's
mother! Harry and I recently exchanged emails about this historic argument, and
he kindly gave me permission to share with you the following excerpt from one
of his emails:
I had the ultra-strange experience of being like a parent watching his child in the
school play but in reverse. You know probably where the clerks sit to the right of
the advocates and I had to sit there keeping
my cool while hanging on every word
44
and metaphorically biting my nails.

Harry's nail biting and his mother Roz's advocacy were evidently
effective. In Allegheny, the Court did strike down one of two challenged
government-sponsored displays of religious symbols during the winter holiday
season, although it upheld a second such display.4 5 In Lee, the Court struck down
a school-sponsored graduation prayer.4 6 In both cases, the Justices were deeply
split and wrote impassioned opinions.
In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy concluded that both of the challenged
displays should have been upheld, and he condemned the Court's striking down
of one display in unusually harsh language. He accused the Court of harboring
either a "latent hostility" or a "callous indifference" 47 toward religion. This
prompted the following strong retort from Justice Blackmun, who had authored
the Court's opinion:
[Justice Kennedy's] accusations ...[are] as offensive as they are absurd. Justice
Kennedy apparently has misperceived a respect for religious pluralism, a respect
commanded by the Constitution, as hostility or indifference to religion. No
misperception could 4be
more antithetical to the values embodied in the
8
Establishment Clause.

43. 492 U.S. 573, 655 79 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in partand dissenting in part),
abrogatedby Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
44. Email from Harry Litman to Nadine Strossen (Dec. 25, 2018, 5:46 PM) (on file with author).
45. 492 U.S. at 574 75 (majority opinion).
46. 505 U.S. at 599.
47. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657, 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in partand dissenting in
part).
48. Id. at 610 (majority opinion).
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Given this opinion, it was not surprising how Justice Kennedy voted three
years later, after the oral argument in Lee v. Weisman, to reject the ACLU's
challenge to government-sponsored graduation prayers.4 9 In fact, Chief Justice
Rehnquist assigned Justice Kennedy to write the majority opinion upholding
such prayers. However, to the surprise of everyone-including, apparently,
Justice Kennedy himself-he concluded that his draft of this opinion "looked
quite wrong," as he wrote in a note to Justice Blackmun, explaining that he was
reaching out in light of the "barbs... between the two of us" in their prior
opinions.50 Therefore, Justice Kennedy's assigned majority opinion rejecting the
Establishment Clause challenge instead morphed into a majority opinion
upholding that challenge, which was joined by Justice Blackmun and the Court's
three other most liberal members.
Substantively, Justice Kennedy's opinion striking down the schoolsponsored prayer stressed his consistent theme of government neutrality in the
realm of individual conscience and expression. Just as government may neither
favor nor disfavor any idea in the free speech context, it likewise may neither
favor nor disfavor any belief in the religion context. As Justice Kennedy
memorably put it in Lee:
[R]eligious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be either
proscribed or prescribed by the State.... [T]ransmission of religious beliefs and
worship is ...a choice committed
to the private sphere, which itself is promised
51
freedom to pursue that mission.

Even in the earlier Allegheny case, Justice Kennedy had also championed
the same overarching value of neutrality; his support for a different outcome in
Lee reflects his recalibration of how best to promote neutrality. Recall, in
Allegheny, Justice Kennedy had viewed the Court's striking down of
government-sponsored religion as reflecting its hostility toward religion, not the
required neutrality.
In contrast, in Lee Justice Kennedy rejected such a conclusion, given the
facts of that case, stressing that Establishment Clause rulings are very factspecific. 52 Specifically, Justice Kennedy disavowed any "hostility to" religious
beliefs. 53 Echoing Justice Blackmun's opinion in Allegheny, Justice Kennedy's
Lee opinion cited the Court's duty to enforce Establishment Clause limits on
government endorsement of religion as an essential aspect of its "duty to
guard... that sphere of inviolable conscience.., which is the mark of a free

49. 505 U.S. at 599.
50. See, e.g., Mark Walsh, Justice 's PapersReveal Surpriseson Key Education Cases, EDUC. WK. (Mar.
17, 2004), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2004/O3/17/27blackmun.h23.html (internal quotation marks
omitted).
51. Lee, 505 U.S. at 589.
52. Id. at 597.
53. Id. at 598.
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people."54 This perspective reflects Justice Kennedy's overarching vision of
neutrality, including in other First Amendment contexts.
To be sure, just as I indicated above that I believe Justice Kennedy did not
correctly enforce free speech precepts of content neutrality in important specific
cases, I also believe that he did not correctly enforce principles of government
neutrality toward religion in important specific cases.55 Nonetheless, it would be
unfair to conclude that he consistently departed from neutral First Amendment
56
principles in favor of his conservative political and/or religious views.
To the contrary, there are noteworthy instances in which Justice Kennedy
staunchly upheld First Amendment principles even when the results were clearly
at odds with conservative values. In addition to Lee v. Weisman, other striking
examples include his votes upholding the right to bum or otherwise "desecrate"
the U.S. flag 57 and his majority opinion striking down certain contested
provisions of the federal Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) 5 in
60
59
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. All of these decisions were closely split,
indicating that there was a plausible First Amendment rationale for reaching the
opposite result. Justice Kennedy's separate concurring opinion in the first flag
burning case underscores how personally difficult he found it to vote in
accordance with his understanding of First Amendment principles, rather than
his policy preferences; that opinion also indicates that he anticipated how deeply
61
unpopular his vote would be.
Indeed, all of these rulings unleashed a torrent of public and political
criticism, from across the political spectrum. 62 The opposition to the Court's flag
burning decisions was so intense and extensive that the first such ruling
54. Id. at 592.
55. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
56. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, Kennedy's Supreme CourtLegacy, HERALD & REV. (Aug. 2,2018),
https://herald-review.con/opinion/columnists/erwin-chemerinsky-kennedy-s-supreme-courtlegacy/article_601c0966-6d56-5d51-9cb3-b75f4d9512c3.html; Andrew Cohen, Anthony Kennedy Was No
Moderate, NEW REPUBLIC (June 27, 2018), https://newrepublic.con/article/149449/anthony-kennedy-nomoderate; Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Justice Kennedy Wasn't a Moderate, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 3, 2018,
5:58 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.con/features/justice-kennedy-wasnt-a-moderate.
57. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
58. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 100 Star. 3009, 3009 27
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. 111996)).
59. 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (striking down 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D) (2000)).
60. The decisions in Eichman and Johnson were split 5-4. Free Speech Coalition was split 6-3.
61. See Johnson,491 U.S. at 420 21 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that his joining the majority opinion
"exacts its personal toll").
62. See, e.g., Court Sets Off Furor on Flag Burning, in 45 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1989, at 307, 307 14
(1990); Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Voids Flag Law; Stage Setfor Amendment Battle, N.Y. TIMES (June
12, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/12/us/supreme-court-voids-flag-law-stage-set-for-amendmentbattle.html; Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4, Back Protesters'Rightto Burn the Flag, N.Y. TIMES (June 22,
06
1989),
https://www.nytimes.conl/1989/ /22/us/justices-5 -4-back-protester s-right-to-burn-the-flag.html;
Warren Richey, High Court Allows Virtual-Child Pornography, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR (Apr. 17, 2002),
https ://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0417/pOl s06-usju.html.
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immediately galvanized a mass, bipartisan movement to overcome it by
amending the First Amendment. That proposed amendment has garnered the
required support of three-quarters of state legislatures; it has gotten the required
support of two-thirds of the U.S. House of Representatives; and it has come
63
within one vote of the required two-thirds super-majority in the U.S. Senate.
Given Justice Kennedy's key role as the "swing vote" in all of these cases, and
the fact that many conservative pundits and politicians viewed him as defecting
64
from their camp, his votes triggered especially vitriolic attacks upon him.
Hence, it took no small measure of principle and courage to vote and write in
these cases as he did.
Particularly striking in this regard is Justice Kennedy's opinion in the Free
Speech Coalition case. Child pornography-sexually explicit depictions of
minors-is understandably deeply reviled, and at the time of this case, our
country was experiencing an especially strong wave of revulsion, which some
commentators labeled a "moral panic." 65 Indeed, the CPPA itself was one
manifestation of such a panic, criminalizing expression that in fact did not entail
any abuse-or even any use-of any minor. Instead, the CPPA outlawed "virtual
child pornography," images that "appeared to be" or were marketed as being,
depictions of minors, but in fact were not. 66 In contrast to anti-obscenity laws,
the CPPA included no exemption for works with "serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value." 6 Examples of expression with such serious value,
which could incur criminal penalties under the CPPA, included Academy
Award-winning movies that Justice Kennedy cited in his opinion, such as
American Beauty and Traffic, since they employed adult actors to play the roles
68
of minor teenagers engaged in sexual conduct.
Despite the CPPA's clear constitutional flaws, and its endangerment of a
vast array of artistically acclaimed and mainstream expression, it is not
surprising that the constitutional challenges to it were almost all repudiated in
the lower courts. Given its use of the demonizing label "child pornography,"
especially in the climate of the times, this outcome was probably predictable.
Out of the approximately forty federal court judges who considered

63. See
Background
on
the
Flag
Desecration
Amendment,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/background-flag-desecration-amendment (last visited May 13, 2019); Carl Hulse &
John Holusha, Amendment on Flag Burning Fails by One Vote in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2006),
https ://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/washington/27cnd-flag.html.
64. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, In Battle to Pick Next Justice, Right Says, Avoid a Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES (June
27, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/27/politics/in-battle-to-pick-next-justice-right-says-avoid-akennedy.html; Supreme Court Rules FirstAmendmentProtects "Virtual" Child Porn, CONCERNED WOMEN FOR
AM. (Aug. 23, 2002), https://concernedwomen.org/supreme-court-rules-first-amendment-protects-virtual-childporn.
65. See, e.g., Suzanne Ost, Children at Risk: Legal and Societal Perceptions of the Potential Threat that
the Possession of Child PornographyPoses to Society, 29 J.L. & Soc'y 436 (2002).
66. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 100 Star. 3009, 3009 27.
67. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
68. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 247-48 (2002).
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constitutional challenges to the CPPA between 1996 and 2002 (when Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coalition was decided), a striking thirty-seven of them found
some rationale for rejecting those challenges. 69 The judges who rejected the
challenges included at least nine who had been appointed by Democratic
Presidents and several who had records and reputations that were in general
supportive of free speech values. That even such judges could not bring
themselves to neutrally enforce free speech principles in the context of
expression that Congress sought to outlaw as "child pornography" underscores
the courage and principled consistency in Justice Kennedy's opinion.
As for the occasional disparity between Justice Kennedy's forceful
invocations of neutral First Amendment principles in the abstract and his
enforcement of such principles in actual cases, I would like to inject two
cautionary notes. First, no matter how self-confidently each of us likely believes
that we are consistently adhering to neutral principles, at least some observers
would criticize what they view as deviations from the same. Given my ACLU
leadership experience, I can attest that critics regularly chastise the ACLU on
that ground. To cite one recent example, in the wake of our defense of the free
speech rights of white nationalist demonstrators in Charlottesville in 2017, we
have been assailed both for insufficiently adhering to our principles concerning

69. The following decisions all rejected constitutional challenges to the CPPA: United States v. Paul, 274
F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Peebles, 275 F.3d 46 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), vacated, 535 U.S.
1014 (2002) (mem.); United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001), affg 248 74 F. Supp. 2d 696 (E.D.
Tex. 1999), vacated, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002) (mem.); United States v.White, 2 F.App'x 295 (4th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002) (mem.); United States v.
Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999), rev 'g 999 F. Supp.
131 (D. Me. 1998); United States v. Brown, No. 00-CR-112-C, 2001 WL 34373161, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16,
2001) (noting that First Amendment questions were present but holding that CPPA was not unconstitutional);
United States v. Berry, No. 00-CR-89-B-S, 2001 WL 243491 (D. Me. Mar. 12, 2001); United States v. Fiscus,
105 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (D. Utah 2000); United States v. Pearl, 89 F. Supp. 2d. 1237 (D. Utah 2000), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 324 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2003); Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, No. C 97-0281VSC, 1997 WL
487758 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v.
James, 55 M.J. 297 (C.A.A.F. 2001), affg 53 M.J. 612 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000). In contrast, only the
following decisions reached the opposite conclusion, striking down the CPPA as unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad: Free Speech Coal., 198 F.3d 1083 (twojudges holding that CPPA was unconstitutional due to its not
being content-neutral and being vague and overbroad, with one judge dissenting), rev 'g No. C 97-028 1VSC,
1997 WL 487758 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1997); United States v. Hilton, 999 F. Supp. 131 (D. Me. 1998) (holding
that CPPA was unconstitutional due to one section being vague and overbroad, therefore finding its definition
of "child pornography" constitutionally invalid), rev'd, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999).
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equality rights" ° and for insufficiently adhering to our principles concerning free
speech and association rights."1
The second cautionary note stresses what I consider to be the most
important perspective when we assess the records of any of our fellow/sister
human beings, with our inherent imperfections. It is a statement I recall having
read from an unknown source, which refers to the justly celebrated architects of
our admirable-but certainly imperfect-Constitution. That statement applies
as well to Supreme Court Justices and others who strive to advance
constitutional principles, including Justice Anthony Kennedy. Along with the
rest of us, the Constitution's Framers were imperfect, inconsistently adhering to
their professed principles. We should celebrate the remarkable ideals they
embraced in the Declaration of Independence: that we are all "created equal,"
equally entitled to certain "unalienable rights." And we should all castigate their
deep deviations from those ideals, including by perpetuating enslavement and
subjugation of too many of their fellow/sister human beings. The statement I
read urges us to be inspired and guided by their vision, despite their blind spots.
I will close with one of Justice Kennedy's statements that most eloquently
captures his powerful vision of government respect for individual autonomy in
the realm of ideas and beliefs. Despite what we might view as his occasional
blind spots in implementing it, that vision should continue to inspire and guide
us. As he wrote: "At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each
person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life
rest upon this ideal."12

70. See Joseph Goldstein, After Charlottesville, A. C.L.U. Bracesfor the Next Alt-Right Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/04/us/aclu-charlottesville-white-supremacists.html;Joseph
Goldstein, After Backing Alt-Right in Charlottesville,A. C.L. U. Wrestles with Its Role, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.corr/2017/08/17/nyregion/aclu-free-speech-rights-charlottesville-skokierally.html; Ned Oliver, Board Member of Va. ACLU Resigns in Protestof Group's Stance on Charlottesville
Rally, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/board-memberof-va-aclu-resigns-in-protest-of-group/article_2d030782-80bc-5f4b-b5ef-73d525a69a6b.html.
71. See Wendy Kaminer, The ACLU Retreats from Free Expression, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2018, 6:17
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-aclu-retreats-from-free-expression-1529533065; Robby Soave, Will the
ACLU Defend Controversial Speech? Ira Glasser, Wendy Kaminer, Nadine Strossen React to the Memo,
06
REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (June 26,2018, 9:50 AM),https://reason.conilblog/2018/
/26/will-the-aclu-defendcontroversial-speec.
72. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
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